Research

Papers

The Real Problem With Counterfactual Accounts of Harm

Synthese (2026), doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05661-3

I argue that counterfactual accounts of harm cannot count most standard harms as harmful.

A paper on the ambiguity of many conditionals

Draft available 

I argue that indicative will-conditionals about the future are ambiguous between epistemic and historical readings.

A paper on why many conditionals are ambiguous

Draft available

I give a new explanation for why many indicative and subjunctive conditionals are ambiguous between epistemic and historical readings, which has more explanatory power and gets more of the data right compared to alternative explanations of the ambiguity.

A paper challenging counterfactual accounts

In Progress (draft soon)

Counterfactual accounts - of harm, causation, disposition, knowledge, freedom, right action, etc. - are usually expected to deliver context-invariant verdicts. But because of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals, I argue that no acceptable counterfactual account delivers such verdicts.

A paper defending a perspectivalist view on free will

In Progress (draft soon)

I argue that whether someone acted freely in a given situation, and is morally responsible, is perspective-dependent. In particular, I argue that we can only give answers that hold relative to the level of explanation offered for why the person acted as they did.