I'm a PhD student at the LSE.
My research areas are in the philosophy of language, moral philosophy, and epistemology.
My main research programme is on conditionals. This programme can be divided into two projects. The first project is dedicated to core questions in the philosophy of language about the relationship between different types of conditionals and context-sensitivity. The second project is dedicated to figuring out what conditionals are good for. In particular, I focus on how – and for what purposes – counterfactuals should be used in philosophy.
email: a[dot]j[dot]wingardh[at]lse[dot]ac[dot]uk
papers
The Real Problem With Counterfactual Accounts of Harm
r&r (email me for a draft)
I argue that counterfactual accounts of harm cannot count most standard harms as harmful.
Many Conditionals Are Ambiguous
In Review (email me for a draft)
I argue that indicative conditioanls about the future are ambiguous.
Why Many Conditionals Are Ambiguous
In Progress (draft soon)
I present and defend a new explanation for why many conditionals, including many indicative and subjunctive conditionals, are ambiguous.